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UTAH SUPREME COURT 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Appellee/Respondent, 
v. 
DENNIS SHOULDERBLADE, 
Case No. 
Category 13 
Appellant/Petitioner. 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the court of appeals commit plain error in its failure to address the 
issue of attenuation between an illegal stop and voluntary consent? 
2. Was petitioner denied his state and federal constitutional right to 
effective assistance of counsel by appellate counsel's failure to raise the issue of the 
lack of attenuation between the illegal stop and the voluntary consent in petitioner's 
first appeal of right? 
OPINION BELOW 
The court of appeal's opinion was issued on March 19, 1992, in State v. 
Shoulderblade, Utah Adv. Rep. (Utah App. 1992). The appeal of the co-
defendant was also issued on March 19, 1992, in State v. Small. 182 Utah Adv. Rep. 
55 (Utah App. 1992). Copies of both opinions are contained in the addendum. 
1 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This court has jurisdiction to consider this petition for writ of certiorari pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2 (1953 as amended). 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches 
and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall 
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons of things to be seized. 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy 
the right . . . to have the assistance of counsel for his 
defense. 
Article I, Section 12 of the Constitution of Utah: 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the 
right to appear and defend in person and by counsel . . . 
and the right to appeal in all cases. 
Article I, Section 14 of the Constitution of Utah: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches 
and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall 
issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or 
affirmation, particularly describing the place to be searched, 
and the person or thing to be seized. 
2 
Utah Code Ann. §77-1-6 (1953 as amended): 
(1) In criminal prosecutions the defendant is entitled: 
(a) to appear in person and defend in person or by 
counsel, . . . 
(g) to the right to appeal in all cases. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Petitioner and the co-defendant, Lemuel T. Small, were jointly charged in a 
twelve count information alleging the commission of six felonies and six 
misdemeanors. (R. 3) Ultimately, petitioner was tried on a three count amended 
information alleging two counts of Possession of a Controlled Substance with Intent 
to Distribute (methamphetamine and marijuana) and one count of Possession of a 
Controlled Substance (cocaine). (R. 150-151) The charges arose out of a roadblock 
stop and subsequent search of a vehicle in which petitioner was driving and Small 
was the passenger. Prior to trial, petitioner and Small made motions to suppress the 
evidence seized as a result of the search of the vehicle. (R. 26-29) It was alleged that 
the evidence was seized in violation of Article I, Section 14 of the Constitution of 
Utah and the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. 
(R. 88-131) In a written order, the motions to suppress were denied. (R. 68-71) 
Petitioner and Small were jointly tried and convicted by a jury. (R. 195) Petitioner was 
sentenced to serve a indeterminate term of not less than one nor more than fifteen 
3 
years in the state prison for the conviction of count I of the information. Concurrent 
five year sentences were imposed for the convictions of counts 2 and 3. (R. 281-285) 
Both petitioner and Small appealed their convictions to the Utah Court of 
Appeals. (R. 273-274, 304-305) The two had separate counsel and briefs were filed 
independently. However, the two cases were argued on the same date before the 
same panel of judges. In both cases, the court held that the roadblock stop of the 
vehicle violated the fourth amendment. Likewise, in both cases, the court of appeals 
found that there was a voluntary consent to the search of the vehicle. However, 
counsel for Small argued that any consent was not sufficiently attenuated from the 
illegal roadblock to dissipate the taint of that roadblock. Based on that argument, the 
court of appeals reversed Small's conviction. Counsel for petitioner did not raise the 
attenuation argument. The court of appeals affirmed petitioner's conviction because 
the attenuation argument was not raised by counsel. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THIS COURT SHOULD ADOPT THE "PLAIN ERROR" OR 
"EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES" RULE IN REVIEWING 
APPELLATE PROCEEDINGS IN THE LOWER COURT. 
The trial court ruled that the roadblock in question did not violate the fourth 
amendment or Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution. On appeal, the state 
conceded that the roadblock violated the fourth amendment. Petitioner's prior counsel 
failed to argue that there was insufficient attenuation between the voluntary consent 
4 
and the illegal stop. In its opinion affirming the conviction, the court of appeals did 
specifically address this issue. The court stated, 
Shoulderblade did not argue before the trial court, or 
before this court, that the consent given to search the 
vehicle was involuntary, or that it was insufficiently 
attenuated from the illegal roadblock to justify the search. 
As the State points out, while a non-attenuation argument 
was unavailable to Shoulderblade in the trial court, 
because, as acknowledged in State v. Sims, 808 P.2d 141, 
150 (Utah App. 1991), cert, pending, "then-standing 
decisions effectively held that a non-coerced search 
consent, by itself, purged the taint of a primary illegality," 
id. at 150, the argument was available when this case was 
briefed for appeal. However, Shoulderblade has failed to 
articulate such an argument before this court. 
Therefore, in light of the trial court's uncontested 
finding that consent was given to search the vehicle, we 
affirm the trial court's denial of Shoulderblade's motion to 
suppress on the ground that the challenged evidence was 
obtained during a valid consent search, [footnote omitted] 
(Slip opinion at pp. 3-4) 
The co-defendant's appeal was based on the same suppression issues. Small raised 
the attenuation issue and argued this court's ruling in State v. Arrovo, 796 P.2d 684 
(Utah, 1990). The opposite conclusion was reached by the court of appeals. In State 
v. Small, supra, the court ruled, 
The conclusion that there was voluntary consent 
does not end our inquiry as we must also determine if the 
consent was untainted by the prior illegality. [State v.1 
Castner, 179 Utah Adv. Rep. [11] at 14 (Utah App. 1992). 
"We examine several factors to determine if there has been 
an exploitation of a prior illegality: temporal proximity of 
the illegality and the evidence sought to be suppressed, the 
presence of intervening factors, and the purpose and 
5 
flagrancy of the misconduct." id.; accord Sims, 808 P.2d 
at 150; Arrovo. 796 P.2d at 690-91 n.4. 
This case is indistinguishable from Sims. The record 
demonstrates a very short period of time elapsed between 
Small's stop at the roadblock and Officer Whatcott's 
request to search. As for intervening factors, none exist. 
The consent was obtained during the ongoing illegal 
roadblock stop. On the uncontroverted facts before us, we 
conclude that Small's consent to have the vehicle searched 
was not sufficiently attenuated to dissipate the taint of the 
illegal roadblock. 
182 Utah Adv. Rep. at 57. 
To avoid such in inequitable results this court should adopt a "plain error" or 
"exceptional circumstances" rule in appellate review. The "plain error" rule has 
generally been held to be applicable to appellate review of trial proceedings, rather 
than the review of an appellate decision. However, the nature of the plain error rule 
and its purposes are applicable to appellate proceedings. In State v. Eldredae, 773 
P.2d 29 (Utah 1989), the court described the requirements of the plain error rule 
stating, 
The first requirement for a finding of plain error is 
that the error be "plain," i.e., from our examination of the 
record, we must be able to say that it should have been 
obvious to a trial court that it was committing error, 
[citations omitted] 
The second and somewhat interrelated requirement 
for a finding of plain error is that the error affect the 
substantial rights of the accused, i.e., that the error be 
harmful, [footnote omitted] 
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773 P.2d at 35. In State v. Emmett. 184 Utah Adv. Rep. 34 (Utah 1992), this court 
discussed the purpose of the rule: 
This court reviews allegations of plain error despite 
the lack of timely objection, provided, of course, that the 
trial court was not led into error. We do so in order to 
avoid manifest injustice and because, if the error is obvious, 
the trial court has the opportunity to address the error 
regardless of the fact that it was never brought to the 
court's attention, [footnote omitted] 
184 Utah Adv. Rep. at 35. 
In this case, it is obvious that the error in refusing to address the attenuation 
issue was plain. That issue was raised in the court of appeals' written opinion. 
Obviously, the court of appeals had both the awareness of and the opportunity to 
address this issue. Second, the error in refusing to address the issue was harmful. 
The attenuation issue was raised in the co-defendant's appeal. That issue was the 
basis for the reversal of Small's conviction. The error in refusing to address this issue 
is obviously harmful as petitioner's conviction was affirmed and the co-defendant's 
conviction was reversed based on the same incident. This court should grant 
certiorari to review the decision of the court of appeals on the issue of whether that 
court committed plain error in refusing to address the issue of the attenuation 
between the illegal roadblock stop and the voluntary consent to the search the vehicle 
that petitioner was driving. 
The purpose of the "unusual" or "exceptional" circumstances rule is also to 
prevent "manifest injustice", State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920 (Utah App. 1991). 
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In employing this analysis the courts focus on the reason for failing to raise an issue 
and the effect of that failure on the case.1 In this case manifest injustice certainly 
resulted from failure to raise the attenuation issue. The reason for the failure to make 
the argument can be attributed to ineffective assistance of counsel.2 This court 
should grant the petition to review this as well as the plain error issue. 
POINT II 
COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO RAISE THE ISSUE OF THE LACK 
OF ATTENUATION BETWEEN THE ILLEGAL STOP AND 
THE VOLUNTARY CONSENT DENIED PETITIONER HIS 
RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF APPELLATE 
COUNSEL. 
It is appropriate for this court to review the issue of ineffective assistance of 
counsel on appeal in this proceeding. In State v. Humphries, 818 P.2d 1027 (Utah 
1991), the court held that the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel at trial may 
be raised for the first time on appeal. This court found that judicial economy is best 
served by addressing the issue without further proceedings in the lower court if two 
conditions are met. First, the record must be adequate to permit a decision on the 
issue. Second, there must be different counsel to make the argument. Both of these 
conditions are present in this case. The first condition is met in this case because the 
record from the lower courts will not be any different if the issue is determined in this 
1See: State v. Archambeau, supra, at 923, footnote 5. 
2See Point II, infra. 
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court or as a result of a writ filed in the district court. Second, new counsel now 
represents petitioner. 
The issue of ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal has not been addressed 
by this court under either a federal or state constitutional analysis. The Supreme 
Court held in Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963), that criminal defendants are 
entitled to counsel in their first appeal of right. The ruling in the court of appeals in 
the instant case was petitioner's first appeal of right.3 The right to counsel 
necessarily includes the sixth amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. 
Strickland v. Washington. 446 U.S. 668 (1984). In Butterfield v. Cook. 166 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 21 (Utah App. 1992), the court of appeals held that the sixth amendment 
guaranties criminal defendants the right to effective assistance of appellate counsel. 
In Butterfield, the court assumed without discussion that the two prong test 
from Strickland v. Washington, supra, is the appropriate test to determine whether a 
defendant had been denied his right to effective assistance of appellate counsel. That 
test requires a showing of both a deficient performance and that such deficiencies 
were prejudicial. Other courts have held that in determining whether a particular 
defendant has been denied effective assistance of appellate counsel, deficient 
performance alone is sufficient to show a deprivation of that constitutional right. Gay 
v. State. 288 Ark 589, 707 S.W.2d 320 (1986); People v. Valenzuela. 175 Cal App. 
3See: Article I, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution and Utah Code Ann. §77-1-6 
(1953 as amended). 
9 
3d 381, 322 Cal. Rptr. 405 (1985); Commonwealth v. Wine. 694 S.W.2d 689 (Ky. 
1985); and LOOP V. Solem. 398 N.W.2d 140 (S.D. 1986). That is a standard that this 
court should adopt under Article I, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution. This court 
should grant the petition to determine the appropriate standard to review claims of 
denial of the right to effective assistance of counsel under both the Utah and federal 
constitutions. 
No matter which test this court adopts, it is clear that petitioner was denied his 
right to effective assistance of appellate counsel in the instant case. With respect to 
the search and seizure issue, counsel argued only the legality of the initial roadblock 
stop. This was done in spite of the fact that the trial court found that there was a 
voluntary consent to the search of the vehicle. By the time this case was argued in 
the court of appeals, the necessity in making the attenuation argument was well 
settled.4 Furthermore, counsel for the co-defendant briefed that issue and raised it 
at oral argument. Finally, there was no tactical advantage in failing to raise the 
argument. Without arguing attenuation or dissipation of the taint of the illegal 
roadblock, the consent to search makes the evidence seized admissible. 
The issue of prejudice is clearly shown from the result in the co-defendant's 
case. As previously noted, the rulings from the court of appeal in these cases were 
4State v. Arrovo, supra: State v. Robinson. 797 P.2d 431 (Utah App. 1990); State 
v. Sims, supra: State v. Park, 810 P.2d 456 (Utah App.) cert. dgn. 171 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 67 (Utah 1991); State v. Bobo, 803 P.2d 1268 (Utah App. 1990); State v. 
Carter, 812 P.2d 460 (Utah App. 1991). 
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based on the same suppression hearing and joint ruling.5 In State v. Small, supra, the 
attenuation issue was raised and the judgment and conviction were reversed. In 
petitioner's case, the attenuation issue was not raised. The court held that the 
roadblock stop was illegal, but the voluntary consent to the search of the vehicle 
made the evidence admissible. Unquestionably, if the attenuation issue had been 
raised below there is a reasonable probability that the result would be different. This 
court should grant the petition for certiorari to review this issue. 
CONCLUSION 
This court should grant the petition for writ of certiorari to review the ruling of 
the court of appeals on two questions. First, whether that court committed plain error 
in refusing to address the attenuation issue of if exceptional circumstances required 
that issue to be addressed. Second, whether petitioner was denied his constitutional 
right to effective assistance of appellate counsel by the failure to raise that 
attenuation issue. 
DATED this day of May, 1992. 
G. FRED METOS 
Attorney for Petitioner 
5That ruling is attached in the addendum. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed/hand delivered 
on this day of May, 1992, to: 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General for the State of Utah 
236 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
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ADDENDUM 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
******* 
iTE OF UTAH, ) Case Number 88-2413 
Plaintiff, ) 
) RULING 
IUEL THOMAS SMALL, and DENNIS ) 
)ULDERBLADE, 
Defendants, ) 
******** 
This matter came before the Court on the 4th day of 
just, 1989 on defendant's motion to suppress. The parties 
offered certain testimony, a witness was called and testified, 
3 counsel presented their arguments to the Court. The Court, 
zing taken the matter under advisement, and having diligently 
isidered all of the evidence before it, now enters this: 
RULING 
On September 29, 1988, the Utah Highway Patrol, in 
ijunction with the Millard County Sheriff's Office conducted a 
adblock on a flat section of Interstate Highway 15, £outh of 
llmore. Notice of the checkpoint was duly given one week 
fore in the local newspaper of general circulation. Prior to 
tting the roadblock, the officers were briefed and instructed 
check for proper driver's license and vehicle registration. 
During the roadblock, all cars were stopped. Pursuant 
:o the roadblock, defendants were stopped. During the stop, the 
>fficer present observed defendant Small shove a plastic bag 
>etween the front seats of the car- The officer checked both 
lefendants' identification and determined that the car was not 
egistered to either defendant. While awaiting confirmation from 
lispatch regarding registration, the officer asked defendants 
rhether there were any firearms, alcohol, or drugs in the car. 
lhe response was in the negative. The officer then requested 
ermission to search the vehicle. Consent was given. 
As defendant Shoulderblade exited the car, the officer 
oticed a gun under the front seat. Subsequent search of the 
assenger compartment of the vehicle revealed a substantial 
uantity of drugs, drug paraphernalia, money, and loaded 
irearms. In the course of the search of the passenger 
ompartment, the officer asked defendants if they knew anything 
bout the firearms or the drugs. Defendants responded in the 
egative. They were subsequently arrested and were apprised of 
heir rights before any further attempt at questioning. 
As the officer searched the passenger compartment of 
hie vehicle, he smelled what he believed to be raw marijuana. He 
jbsequently, opened the trunk and found more drugs and 
sraphernalia. 
The evidence presented indicates that the roadblock was 
^operly instituted at a fixed point as indicated in Delaware v. 
flat area and was highly visible. By allowing officers to 
>ck licenses and vehicle registration, advanced a legitimate 
rernmental purpose as required in United States v. McFayden, 
i F.2d 1306 (D-C. Cir. 1989)-
As further required in McFayden, there was no 
jcretion on the part of officers stopping the cars—all were 
juired to stop. While there is some question as to whether all 
the large trucks were stopped at the roadblock, there was no 
Bar testimony that they were not stopped. The court notes that 
* Tenth Circuit has ruled that letting certain vehicles through 
3 roadblock unchecked is not, per se, an unlawful practice. 
ited States v. Corral, 823 F.2d 1389 (10th Cir. 1987). In any 
*nt, it is undisputed that all passenger vehicles were stopped. 
Questioning as part of an initial stop does not 
rmally rise to the level of a custodial interrogation. The 
ah Supreme Court has held that Miranda warnings are not 
guired for investigation and interview pursuant to determining 
ether a crime has been committed. Salt Lake City v. Carner, 
4 P.2d 1168, 1170 (Utah 1983). 
The factors required for a Miranda warning under Carner 
e not present- Here questioning as to the contents of the car 
s made as the officer awaited information from the dispatcher 
lative to vehicle registration. Questioning made during the 
arcti of the vehicle was not accusatory. Any interrogation if 
can be called that was brief and informal. See Carner, at 
Lght during the check that created a reasonable suspicion that 
le occupants were engaged in some criminal activity (Carner)• 
le uncontroverted testimony is that the defendants were properly 
3vised of their rights before further attempts at questioning. 
All of the above factors: notice of the stop, its 
^cation, legitimate purpose of the stop, training of the 
fficers, the minimal intrusion by the officers unless there was 
) articulateble and reasonable suspicion, establish a minimum 
public inconvenience. 
Defendants gave permission to search the vehicle. 
)nsent was never withdrawn. As such, the subsequent search of 
le trunk was reasonable and proper. Even if the consent was 
)mehow defective, (and there is no evidence that this is the 
lse) this court believes that due to the evidence found in the 
issenger compartment and the smell of marijuana, the officer had 
obable cause to search the trunk space. See State v. Earl, 716 
2d 803 (Utah 1986). 
Based on the foregoing, the Court concludes that the 
chicle stop, search, and subsequent arrest were properly 
Iministered. The Court therefore denies defendants' motion to 
ippress. 
DATED at Provo, Utah this *2- $ day of August, 1989. 
GEORGE & BALLIF, JUDGE / 
Dexter Anderson ' 
*M 2 T J »1 
This opinion is subject to revision before 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Dennis Shoulderblade, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
MAR 121992 
%bjyW>^— 
"*1tyary T \k)onan 
Clerk ^ we Court 
Utah Co j / t of Appeals 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(Not For Publication) 
Case No. 900288-CA 
F I L E D 
(March 12 f 1992) 
Fourth District, Millard County 
The Honorable George E. Ballif 
Attorneys: Milton T. Harmon, Nephi, for Appellant 
R. Paul Van Dam, Marian Decker, and David B. 
Thompson, Salt Lake City, for Appellee 
Before Judges Billings, Jackson, and Russon. 
JACKSON, Judge: 
This is an appeal from a trial courts denial of appellant 
Dennis Shoulderblade,s motion to suppress certain evidence that 
was obtained as a result of a roadblock and subsequent search of 
the vehicle he was driving. We affirm. 
Shoulderblade has not challenged the trial court's findings 
of fact on appeal. Therefore, we adopt the following facts. 
On September 29, 1988, the Utah Highway Patrol, in conjunction 
with the Millard County Sheriff's office, conducted a roadblock 
in Millard County, Utah, on a section of Interstate 15. 
Approximately fifteen officers were assigned to operate the 
roadblock. They were instructed to check for driver's licenses 
and vehicle registration. In addition, the officers were told to 
further question anyone who looked suspicious. 
During the roadblock, all vehicles were stopped, including 
the vehicle Shoulderblade was driving. Lemuel Small was a 
passenger in that vehicle. Officer Jeffrey Whatcott, W!K> 
executed the stop, testified that both Small and Shoulderblade 
produced valid identification. The vehicle was not registered to 
either Small or Shoulderblade. Small told the officer that the 
vehicle belonged to a friend of his. The officer sought 
confirmation of registration through radio dispatch. He also 
asked Small and Shoulderblade if there were any firearms, 
alcohol, or drugs in the vehicle. Both replied in the negcitive. 
Officer Whatcott then requested permission to search the veihicle. 
Small consented. Both Small and Shoulderblade were arresteid 
after a substantial quantity of drugs, drug paraphernalia, 
firearms, and cash was found in the vehicle. Officer Whatcott 
continued to search the vehicle, and upon smelling marijuana, 
opened the trunk of the vehicle and discovered more drugs and 
paraphernalia. 
Small and Shoulderblade were charged in an amended 
information with several counts of possession of controlled 
substances. Both defendants filed motions to suppress the 
evidence that was found in the vehicle. The motions were based 
on the alleged illegality of the roadblock. The trial court 
concluded that the roadblock was instituted in a lawful manner. 
The court further held that Miranda warnings were not required 
under the facts before it, and that any interrogation that took 
place was brief and informal. The uncontroverted testimony 
indicated that both Small and Shoulderblade were properly advised 
of their rights before further attempts at questioning them took 
place. 
The trial court made the following findings: Small and 
Shoulderblade consented to the search of the vehicle; the consent 
was never withdrawn; even if the consent were found to be somehow 
defective, there was probable cause to search the trunk of the 
vehicle. Based on the foregoing, the court denied the motions to 
suppress. 
Small and Shoulderblade were tried by a jury on February 16, 
1990. The jury convicted Small of one count of possession of a 
controlled substance (cocaine), a third degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 1988), and 
two counts of possession of a controlled substance with intent to 
distribute (methamphetamine and marijuana), a second and a third 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(iv) 
(Supp. 1988).l Shoulderblade appeals the trial court's denial of 
his motion to suppress the evidence found as a result of the 
search. 
Shoulderblade first asserts that the roadblock at which he 
was stopped violated his constitutional right .against 
1. The current versions of the statutes under which Shoulderblade 
was convicted are codified at Utah Code Ann. V 58-37-8 (Supp. 
1992) . 
unreasonable searches and seizures. The State concedes that the 
roadblock in question does not pass muster under the federal 
constitution, and therefore we reverse the trial court/s 
determination that the roadblock was conducted in a legal manner. 
Shoulderblade did not argue before the trial court, or 
before this court, that the consent given to search the vehicle 
was involuntary, or that it was insufficiently attenuated from 
the illegal roadblock to justify the search. As the State points 
out, while a nonattenuation argument was unavailable to 
Shoulderblade in the trial court, because, as acknowledged in 
State v. Sims, 808 P.2d 141, 150 (Utah App. 1991), cert, pending, 
"then-standing decisions effectively held that a non-coerced 
search consent, by itself, purged the taint of a primary 
illegality," jjd. at 150, the argument was available when this 
case was briefed for appeal. However, Shoulderblade has failed 
to articulate such an argument before this court. 
Therefore, in light of the trial courts uncontested finding 
that consent was given to search the vehicle, we affirm the trial 
court's denial of Shoulderblade's motion to suppress on the 
ground that the challenged evidence was obtained during a valid 
consent search.2 
Norman H. Jackson^Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
Leonard H. Russon, Judge 
2. Shoulderblade also asserts because the evidence was seized as 
a result of interrogations which violated his right against self-
incrimination, the evidence is inadmissible. Nothing in his 
statement of facts, however, comes close to describing any 
interrogation that might have taken place, or what;, if any 
incriminating statements were obtained therefrom. Further, 
the trial court found that the questioning that took place during 
the search of the vehicle was "not accusatory," and that the 
uncontroverted testimony indicated that Shoulderblade was advised 
of his constitutional rights following his arrest. Shoulderblade 
has not cited us to anywhere in the record that disputes this 
finding. 
**-*«-^aLj 
This opinion is subject to revision before - —JlfiR J 9 ]gg^ 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. ^^OAjU^f/h 
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JACKSON, Judge: 
This is an appeal from a trial court's denial of appellant 
Lemuel T. Small's motion to suppress evidence obtained as a 
result of a roadblock and subsequent search of the vehicle in 
which Small was a passenger. We reverse and remand for a new 
trial in which the evidence seized from the vehicle is to be 
suppressed. 
FACTS 
Small does not challenge the trial court's findings of fact. 
Therefore, for purposes of this appeal the facts are as follows. 
On September 29, 1988, the Utah Highway Patrol, in 
conjunction with the Millard County Sheriff's office, conducted a 
roadblock in Millard County, Utah, on a section of Interstate 15. 
Notice of the roadblock was published in the Millard County 
Chronicle one week before the roadblock was instituted and signs 
were placed on the freeway, warning drivers that they would have 
to stop. Approximately fifteen officers were assigned to operate 
the jgoadblock. They were instructed to check for drivers' 
licefpes and vehicle registration. In addition, the officers 
were told to further question anyone who looked suspicious. 
During the roadblock, all vehicles were stopped, including 
the vehicle in which Small was a passenger. The vehicle was 
driven by Dennis Shoulderblade. Officer Jeffrey Whatcott, who 
executed the stop, testified that both Small and Shoulderblade 
produced valid identification. The vehicle was not registered to 
either Small or Shoulderblade. Small told the officer that the 
vehicle belonged to a friend of his. Officer Whatcott sought 
confirmation of registration through radio dispatch. He also 
asked Small and Shoulderblade if there were any firearms, 
alcohol, or drugs in the vehicle. Both replied in the negative. 
Officer Whatcott requested permission to search the vehicle, and 
Sma11 consented. 
In searching the vehicle, Officer Whatcott located a 
substantial quantity of drugs, drug paraphernalia, firearms, and 
cash. Both Small and Shoulderblade were arrested. Officer 
Whatcott continued to search the vehicle, and upon smelling 
marijuana, opened the trunk of the vehicle and discovered more 
drugs and paraphernalia. 
In an amended information, Small and Shoulderblade were 
charged with several counts of possession of controlled 
substances. Both defendants filed motions to suppress the 
evidence that was found in the vehicle. The motions were based 
on the alleged illegality of the roadblock. The trial court 
concluded that the roadblock was instituted in a lawful manner. 
The trial court also found that Small and Shoulderblade consented 
to the search of the vehicle, and that the consent was never 
withdrawn. Based on the foregoing, the court denied the motions 
to suppress. 
Small and Shoulderblade were tried by a jury on February 16, 
1990. The jury convicted Small of one count of possession of a 
controlled substance (cocaine), a third degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 1988), and 
two counts of possession of a controlled substance with intent to 
distribute (methamphetamine and marijuana), a second and a third 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(iv) 
(Supp. 1988).* 
1. The current versions of the statutes under which Small was 
convicted are codified at Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (Supp. 1992) . 
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ISSUES 
Small appeals the denial of his motion to suppress, 
contending that (1) the roadblock stop of the vehicle in which he 
was riding was illegal; and (2) because there was insufficient 
attenuation between the illegal roadblock and any consent given, 
all evidence discovered subsequent to the roadblock stop should 
have been suppressed by the trial court. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
In reviewing a challenge to a lower court's suppression 
ruling, we will not reverse the findings of fact underlying that 
ruling unless they are clearly erroneous. State v. Palmer, 803 
P.2d 1249, 1251 (Utah App. 1990r»»cert. denied, 802 P.2d 748 
(Utah 1991). Those factual findings are clearly erroneous only 
if they are against the clear weight of the evidence. State v. 
Castner, 179 Utah Adv. Rep. 11, 12 (Utah App. 1992); State v. 
Leonard, 175 Utah Adv. Rep. 49, 50 (Utah App. 1991). The issue 
of the constitutionality of a roadblock stop is a matter of law 
which we review with no particular deference to the trial court's 
conclusions. State v. Sims, 808 P.2d 141, 144 (Utah App. 1991), 
cert, pending. 
LEGALITY OF THE ROADBLOCK 
Small asserts that the roadblock at which he was stopped 
violated his constitutional right against unreasonable searches 
and seizures. Specifically, Small alleges that the roadblock did 
not meet the objective standards required by the Fourth Amendment 
of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 14 of 
the Utah Constitution. 
At the time of its denial of Small's motion to suppress, the 
trial court did not have the benefit of the United States Supreme 
Court's decision in Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 
U.S. 444, 110 S. Ct. 2481 (1990). The State concedes that the 
roadblock in the present case fails to meet the requirements for 
roadblocks set out in Sitz. We agree. Thus, the roadblock stop 
violated Small's Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable 
seizures, and the trial court's conclusion to the contrary is 
reversed.2 
2. Because the roadblock does not pass muster under the federal 
constitution, we need not consider its validity under the state 
constitution. See State v. Park, 810 P.2d 456, 458 n.l (Utah 
App.), cert, denied. 817 P.2d 327 (Utah 1991). 
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ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE FOLLOWING ILLEGAL ROADBLOCK 
Having determined that the roadblock stop of the vehicle was 
unconstitutional, we must now determine if the subsequent 
warrantless search was nevertheless valid. Relying on State v. 
Sims, 808 P.2d 141 (Utah App. 1991), cert, pending. Small 
asserts that while he consented to the search of the vehicle, his 
consent was obtained as a result of an unbroken chain of events 
that began with the illegal roadblock, and that as a result, his 
consent is not valid. 
The State has the burden of establishing that the evidence 
obtained following the illegal roadblock was not tainted by 
showing the consent given was sufficiently attenuated from that 
illegality. See Sims, 808 P.2d at 151. 
Two factors determine whether consent to 
a search is lawfully obtained following 
initial police misconduct. The inquiry 
should focus on whether the consent was 
voluntary and whether the consent was 
obtained by police exploitation of the prior 
illegality. Evidence obtained in searches 
following police illegality must meet both 
tests to be admissible. 
State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684, 688 (Utah 1990) (citing 3 W. 
LaFave, Search and Seizure § 8.2(d), at 190 (2d ed. 1987)). The 
State argues that because the trial court did not make explicit 
findings on either prong of the Arroyo test, we should remand for 
the trial court to make detailed findings to support the consent 
determination. We decline the State's invitation to remand for 
further findings3 because, as this court stated in State v. 
Castner, 179 Utah Adv. Rep. 11, 14 & n.3 (Utah App. 1992), when 
the record at the suppression hearing is sufficiently detailed 
and there are no contested facts, we are in as good a position as 
the trial court to decide the taintedness/attenuation issue. 
3. We acknowledge that fact-sensitive issues such as consent are 
best resolved by the trial court. However, in this case counsel 
for both Small and for the State indicated at oral argument that 
there were no facts in dispute and it was doubtful that any 
further enlightening facts would be forthcoming. 
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A. Voluntary Consent 
Voluntariness of consent is a fact sensitive question and we 
look to the totality of circumstances to ascertain if there is 
clear and positive testimony that the consent was unequivocal and 
freely given. Castner, 179 Utah Adv. Rep. at 13; Carter, 812 
P.2d at 467; State v. Grovier, 808 P.2d 133, 136 (Utah App. 
1991); State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d 880, 887-88 (Utah App.), cert, 
denied, 800 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1990). The trial court determined 
that Small had consented to the searches. Small does not 
challenge that ruling on appeal. However, the trial court did 
not address whether or not the consent was voluntary. This is an 
important first prong in the Arroyo analysis. We find nothing in 
the undisputed facts that suggests Small's consent was not 
voluntary. 
B. Dissipation of Taint 
The conclusion that there was voluntary consent does not end 
our inquiry as we must also determine if the consent was 
untainted by the prior illegality. Castner, 179 Utah Adv. Rep. 
at 14. "We examine several factors to determine if there has 
been an exploitation of a prior illegality: temporal proximity 
of the illegality and the evidence sought to be suppressed, the 
presence of intervening factors, and the purpose and flagrancy of 
the misconduct.11 id.; accord Sims, 808 P. 2d at 150; Arroyo, 796 
P.2d at 690-91 n.4. 
This case is indistinguishable from Sims. The record 
demonstrates a very short period of time elapsed between Small's 
stop at the roadblock and Officer Whatcott's request to search. 
As for intervening factors, none exist. The consent was obtained 
during the ongoing illegal roadblock stop. On the uncontroverted 
facts before us, we conclude that Small's consent to have the 
vehicle searched was not sufficiently attenuated to dissipate the 
taint of the illegal roadblock. 
CONCLUSION 
Small's convictions are reyersed and the case is remanded to 
the trial court for proceedings in accord with this opinion. 
Norman H. Jackson, ^ fudge 
WE CONCUR: 
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
Leonard H. Russon, Judge 
